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Abstract
Daily collectors operate worldwide; they charge a fee in exchange for the collection of their client’s deposits.
The clients recover their savings after one month. With a negative nominal return of -3.3% per month, the
service is quite expensive but nonetheless prevalent among the very poor. The economic literature so far
emphasizes two motives for making deposits: (i) it is safer than bringing the money home, (ii) people want to
commit to save. I argue that in addition to these two motives, people make deposits in order to reduce their
contribution to the household’s expenses and increase their private consumption. This intra-household motive
is ﬁrst modelled and then tested using a unique panel data set collected in Benin.
The panel structure of the data allows me to isolate the eﬀect of the third motive. Additionally, I show that
daily collectors enable women to make more gifts to their children and acquaintances, and allow men to reduce
those gifts and their participation to household’s public goods. There is large positive eﬀect of the deposits on
people’s purchase of new clothes, and making deposits increases women’s expenditures on frivolous goods by
200% to 300%. Finally, the commitment motive appears to be an important determinant of men’s deposits.
Keywords: Intra-household, deposit collectors, micro-savings, non-cooperative household’s members, public
good provision, commitment.
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1 Introduction
People who do not have access to formal banking and insurance services resort to informal means of
obtaining credit, insuring themselves or accumulating savings. These means are often termed micro-
insurance, micro-credit and micro-savings. While the former two are extensively studied by develop-
ment economists, there is much less analysis of the latter, mainly because of a lack of suitable data.
Savings are diﬃcult to measure, as they can take many diﬀerent forms.
I study a particular micro-saving institution called “daily collectors” (DC).1 Daily collectors charge
a fee in exchange for collecting the savings of their clients. After one month, the clients recover their
savings minus the fee, which is equal to one deposit. In other words, the clients earn a negative
nominal return of -3.3% per month on their savings. As documented by Rutherford et al. (1999) and
Rutherford (2000), daily collectors exist in various places of the world and do not always operate in
the same manner. In particular, daily collectors may also make loans or only take deposits. I restrict
attention to collectors who are not also moneylenders.
The daily collection service is extensively used in Benin. In my sample 36% of people with positive
income make deposits. On average, they deposit CFAF 516 (1.03$) per day. This is relatively high:
on average a client’s daily income is equal to CFAF 1 708, of which he deposits around one third. The
population under study is poor, and therefore the prevalent use of the daily collection service raises
a number of important questions. In particular, a direct policy recommendation for reducing poverty
could be to provide the same service at a lower cost. The design of sound policies however requires
a clear understanding of the motives that prompt people to make costly deposits rather than choose
other forms of savings.
Daily collectors have been studied by economists in diﬀerent contexts. They are generally mentioned
by researchers in micro-ﬁnance (see for instance Besley, 1995; Rutherford, 2000; Collins et al., 2009 and
Armendariz and Murdoch, 2010). Aryeetey and Gockel (1991) include daily collectors in their work on
capital formation in Ghana and Aryeetey and Udry (1997) and Steel et al. (1997) describe them more
generally in Sub-Saharan Africa. However very few researchers have really focused on this institution.
Among them, Ashraf et al. (2006a) use a randomized control trial in the Philippines, to investigate
the determinants of participation in a deposit collection service and evaluate the impact of oﬀering the
service (see also Ashraf, 2009). The service that they oﬀer has however important diﬀerences with the
daily collectors because it is a costless monthly collection. Being married is one important determinant
of take up, which suggests that intra-household issues matter. The physical distance to the bank is
the other important determinant of take-up. The authors also ﬁnd that oﬀering the service of deposit
collection increased the level of savings and decreased borrowing.
In the same line, Dupas and Robinson (2011) provide a randomly selected sample of self-employed
individuals in rural Kenya with access to an interest-free bank account. One of their main ﬁndings
is that the daily private expenditures of women in the treatment group became 27% to 40% higher
than those of women in the comparison group. One interpretation of the authors is that women in the
treatment group might have been better able to shield their income from others.
1 Daily collectors have diﬀerent names in diﬀerent countries. For instance, they are usually called tontinier in Benin,
susu in Ghana and esusu in Nigeria. They are more generally known as mobile bankers in West Africa and deposit
collectors in India.1 Introduction 3
An important feature of the the daily collection is that the clients commit to deposit the same ﬁxed
amount of cash everyday, for 30 days. If a client does not deposit as planned, he has to pay a fee.
Therefore some clients are likely to use the daily collection service as a commitment device.
There is an important literature arguing that individuals level of impatience is lower for future
trade-oﬀs than for near-term trade-oﬀs. The ﬁrst models were developed by Strotz (1955) and Phelps
and Pollak (1968). Time-inconsistent choices may be due to hyperbolic preferences, temptations, or
dual-self agents (see Ashraf et al., 2006b for a review). This literature is however predominantly
theoretical. In fact, Ashraf et al. (2006b) are the ﬁrst to provide ﬁeld evidence linking hypothetical
time discount questions to the decision to use a commitment device. They use a randomized control
methodology to determine the motives behind the take-up of a commitment saving product. They ﬁnd
that women who exhibit time-inconsistent choices, and hence could have a preference for commitment,
are more likely to choose the commitment product.
I use identical time discount questions to identify time-inconsistent individuals, and I show that
time-inconsistency partly explains the use of the deposit collection.
Apart from the commitment motive, people may prefer to make deposits rather than to accumulate
their savings at home because of safety considerations; clients could simply be afraid of loosing their
savings or being robbed. In contrast with Aryeetey and Gockel (1991) who note that 40.3 % of savers
in Ghana had lost their money to run-away deposit collectors, in Cotonou I did not get any reports of
such dishonest behavior.
The safety motive and the commitment motive are already well understood. I introduce a third
reason, the intra-household motive, to explain the use of deposit collection. I argue that individuals
make deposits to increase their private consumption at the expense of their household’s public con-
sumption. When someone makes deposits, he decreases the amount of money that he brings home and
thereby constrains his contribution to the household’s public goods.
The main prediction of the model is a non-monotonic relationship between income share and
deposit. In the remaining of the paper, the expression income share stands for an individuals income
divided by the total income of his household. Deposits are expected to increase with one’s income
share when this share is low and to decrease when it is high. The relationship between deposits and
income share is tested using ﬁrst-hand panel data that I collected with Olivier Dagnelie and Philippe
Lemay-Boucher in Cotonou in 2004 and 2006.
Because the safety and commitment motives are unobserved and very hard to measure, I ﬁrst
assume that risk aversion and the need for commitment did not change between the two periods of
observation. I control for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, to correctly identify the eﬀect of the income share
on the deposits. The results support the theory, with a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the regressor of
interest.
I then use a proxy that identiﬁes time-inconsistent individuals and show that the commitment
motive partly determines the deposits.
Finally, I compare the pattern of expenses of the daily collector’s clients with non-clients. I show
that men who make deposits contribute less to some of the household’s public goods (electricity bills
and school charges) while women’s contribution to school charges also decreases when they make
deposits.2 Context 4
I also ﬁnd that both men and women who make deposits spend much more on personal clothes.
When they make deposits, women, but not men, increase their purchase of frivolous goods, such as
tobacco, alcohol, or candies, by 200% to 300%. These results are in line with the ﬁndings of Dupas and
Robinson (2011) mentioned above, but they contrast with the literature on the divergence between
women and men’s preferences. For instance, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) show that in Ivory Coast,
men spend relatively more than women on goods such as alcohol and cigarettes and less on goods that
beneﬁt children or the household as a whole (see also Bruce (1989); Thomas (1990); Browning (2000);
Duﬂo and Udry (2004); Ashraf (2009)). In Cotonou men also spend more then women on frivolous
goods, but the data show that women use their deposits to sharply increase their purchase of frivolous
goods.
Making deposits could also be a way to protect income against ﬁnancial claims, both because
the deposits cannot be readily redrawn and because they might be concealed and unknown to one’s
relatives and acquaintances. Therefore, those using the service should eﬀectively transfer less money
if they consider the claims as illegitimate. On the other hand, using the daily collector enables the
accumulation of a lump sum that can be used for legitimate transfers. I ﬁnd that men who make
deposits give less to their children and parish fellows, while women who make deposits give less to
their husbands.
The next section discusses some critical characteristics of the functioning of Beninese households
and of access to banking services in Cotonou. In section 3, a simple model of strategic interactions
between household members shows how deposits are related to one’s income share. The model provides
the welfare implications of policies improving access to deposit collection service, which are discussed
at the end of the section. A unique panel data set collected in Benin is then used to provide evidence
supporting the model, and test some of its predictions. The data are presented in section 4. The
econometric estimations are examined in section 5: ﬁrst the relationship between the deposits and the
income share, then the impact of the commitment motive, and ﬁnally the pattern of consumption of
users and non-users. Section 6 concludes.
2 Context
Some essential characteristics of the Beninese households and of the access to banking services in
Cotonou drive the modeling eﬀort.
First, as shown by Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2007), Beninese households do not pool their
resources. There is no common budget between spouses and the contributions to the household’s public
goods are made independently by the members. As Falen, an anthropologist who conducted research
among the Fon for more than a decade2, concludes: “the notion of a married couple’s communal
property or joint bank accounts is totally foreign to most Fon people.(...) Keeping common ﬁnances
would be dangerous since money is always scarce and people are generally willing to take, borrow, beg,
or in other ways extract money from another”, and he adds that “most Fon view descent in patrilinear
terms, husbands and wives belong to diﬀerent families, and have few common kinship loyalties. (...)
Having the option of diverting money from a conjugal account for use by one’s own family could
2 Fon is the most populous ethnic group in Benin.2 Context 5
cause irreparable damage” (Falen, 2011, p.103-104). Some anthropologists and economists already
documented the disconnection between household member’s ﬁnancial spheres (see for instance Moock
(1986); Hoddinott and Haddad (1995); Attanasio and Lechene (2002); Rangel and Thomas (2006)
for reviews).3 Therefore, I assume that the household’s members take their decisions independently
from one another. They are however assumed to behave strategically: their decisions depend on their
partner’s decisions and vice-versa.
Second, the only alternative to deposits is to accumulate cash at home. The data come from the
outskirts of Cotonou, where people live in high density slums. Accumulating assets such as gold,
cattle, or land for example is too risky when not simply impossible. Also, most people cannot use an
account in a bank or a micro-ﬁnance institution (MFI). The ﬁrst reason is that the minimum balance
required by banks is out of reach for most of the population under study. Houssa and Verpoorten
(ming) report that, at the time of the study, it varied from CFAF 100 000 to CFAF 500 000. In the
sample only 7% of the people earn more than CFAF 100 000 per month and the average monthly
income is around CFAF 40 000. People would thus need to accumulate savings in order to open an
account. Moreover, most of them cannot aﬀord to keep hundreds of thousands of CFAF unused on a
bank account as they live in poverty and have pressing needs. In addition to the minimum balance
requirement, people are reluctant to deposit money with banks due to high transport costs. Helms
et al. (2005) estimate weekly costs to be equal to CFAF 5000 for banks and CFAF 150 for MFIs.
When taking into account the nominal interest rates on deposits, Helms et al. (2005) conclude that
one needs to save CFAF 130 000 in a bank or CFAF 36 000 in a MFI, per month, to cover these
costs and choose these institutions rather than a daily collector. Moreover, the attractiveness of the
daily collector increases furthermore when the opportunity cost of transportation and queuing are
accounted for. Finally, as described by Houssa and Verpoorten (ming), the banking sector in Benin
went through a severe crisis and collapsed at the beginning of the nineties. The collapse was partly due
to adverse economic conditions and partly to the actions of the Kerekou government. Among other
policies, the government nationalized all private banks. The banks then started to make loans with
zero interest rate and without collateral to politicians and their supporters (Girardon, 1989). Most of
these loans were not reimbursed and the banks were liquidated. Households’ incomes were severely hit
by the collapse of the banks and people today continue to distrust the banking sector.4 More recently,
in what is called l’aﬀaire ICC-Services, a microﬁnance institution lost the savings of thousands of
people while playing a Ponzi scheme. The aﬀaire provoked a big scandal as close supporters of the
President are allegedly involved, and it undermined further that trust that people had in formal saving
institutions (for a brief account of the aﬀair, see Nossiter, 2010).
Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA), which are very common in Cotonou (Dagnelie
and LeMay, 2008), could be another alternative to daily collectors. Participation to a ROSCA does not
require the payment of any direct cost. ROSCA members meet regularly and they bring a pre-deﬁned
amount of cash money in each meeting. One of the member is then given the total amount collected,
called the pot. The main indirect costs are the cost of attending the meetings, the imposed saving
3 See also Dercon and Krishnan (2000), Duﬂo and Udry (2004) and Munro et al. (2006), who cast doubt on the unitary
model as a relevant representation of household’s functioning.
4 Mathieu Kerekou only left power in 20063 The model 6
rate that potentially diﬀers from one’s optimal level of saving, and the risk that the ROSCA collapses
before each member gets the pot.5 In Cotonou, ROSCAs generally meet every two weeks or every
month. Therefore, people still need to accumulate money either at home or through the daily collector
if they want to participate in a ROSCA. ROSCAs are used to pool bigger amounts of money, and not
to avoid bringing daily incomes home. They also involve a lot of people and it takes several months
or even years before all members get the pot.
One might wonder why people do not join daily ROSCAs that would replicate the service oﬀered
by daily collectors. For an equal deposit, setting up a ROSCA would however require that at least 30
people meet everyday. Even if one can ﬁnd 29 other persons who are willing to meet everyday, the
cost in time and organization is simply too high.
Finally, Anderson and Baland (2002) investigate individual motives to participate in ROSCAs in
Nairobi. Using a Nash bargaining model, they argue that the wives participate in ROSCAs to protect
their savings against claims by their husband for immediate consumption. Their argument is close
to the intra-household motive that I investigate, but is nevertheless very diﬀerent because they do
not allow for strategic interactions between spouses; only the wife has the possibility to join ROSCAs
in order to inﬂuence the ﬁnal household’s consumption. Their main results would be aﬀected if the
husband were also allowed to join a ROSCA or to divert money from the household in reaction to his
wife’s strategy.
In the context of Cotonou, restricting the set of strategies available to players, as done in Anderson
and Baland (2002), would be too strong an assumption. Besides, my main result arises precisely from
the strategic interaction that is at play between household’s members. When an individual decides
how much to deposit, he must take into account how much the other deposits since it aﬀects the money
that is available for the household’s consumption.
3 The model
The model is written in such a way as to capture the essential characteristic of daily collection: using
the service actually amounts to paying someone to be able to bring less money home. The model
depicts a world where people have no access to banks to store their revenues. In order to consume a
private good, they have to bring some money home or make deposits to the daily collector. I assume
that there is no credit market.
There are two agents, a and b, who live for T periods. In each period t 2 T, agent i = fa;bg
receives an income wi. The idea behind the model is that the agents have to choose between their
private consumption and how much they contribute to a public good, g. If they can purchase the
private goods that they want as soon as they receive their incomes, the agents have no reason to
make any deposit. In reality, when they make deposits, they save each day a part of their income and
accumulate these savings until the end of the month. These savings allow them to purchase indivisible
goods, or simply to delay their expenditures to a more appropriate day, such as the market day. I do
not model explicitly the various reasons that push people to save. I am not trying to explain savings
5 References about ROSCAs include Besley et al. (1993); Bouman (1995); Handa and Kirton (1999); Anderson and
Baland (2002); Basu (2008); Anderson et al. (2009). About Benin, see Dagnelie and LeMay (2008) and Dagnelie (2008).3 The model 7
per se, but rather the choice of paying a daily collector rather than simply keeping the money at home.
To this end, it is convenient to assume that the agents utilities depend on their total savings, s, and
their total consumption of the public good, g. This assumption also allows me to abstract away from











where gt = ga
t + gb
t (gi
t is i’s contribution to the public good in period t) and si
t is i’s savings in
t. The utility is assumed to increase with the public good consumption and with the savings and the
marginal utility is non-increasing.
I assume that the agents do not cooperate. They take their decisions simultaneously and inde-
pendently from one another. But they behave strategically and take into account the other agent’s
strategies when they choose their own. Both agents have the possibility to make deposits to the collec-








In the ﬁrst period agent i chooses the amount that he will deposit in each period, di.
The precise steps of the game are as follows:
1. In the ﬁrst period, the agents receive their incomes, wi, and simultaneously and independently




2. Each agent brings wi   di at home and chooses the level of his contribution, gi to the public
good.
3. In all subsequent periods the agents keep on depositing the same amount and bringing the rest
at home where they choose their contribution to the public good.













The solution concept used is the standard Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The game is solved
by backward induction.
3.1 Step 2: the contributions to the public good
Due to the absence of a credit market, in each period, agent i has to respect the following budget
constraint:
gi  wi   di
6 The assumption that k > 1=2 is convenient because it simpliﬁes the discussion without loosing any relevant insights.
It can be shown that when k  1=2 the players never make deposits.3 The model 8




the daily collector in the last period. His total savings,
PT
t=1 si





di   gi = T
 
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The utility functions become Ui = lnT(gi + gi) + lnT(wi   (1   k)di   gi) which is equivalent to
Ui = ln(gi + gi) + ln(wi   (1   k)di   gi) + 2lnT.
The agents choose the contribution to the public good that maximizes their own utility, given the









0 if gb > A









0 if ga > B





Where A = wa   (1   k)da and B = wb   (1   k)db.
An important characteristic of the system formed by the best response functions, is that the solution
depends on the relative incomes of the players. For more clarity, the functions are drawn in Figure 1,
when there are no deposits. Ri indicates i’s best response functions and NE, the Nash Equilibrium.


























i's income share HIGH
Fig. 1: The best response functions (ISa = w
a
wa+wb;da = db = 0)
When there are no deposits, in equilibrium a does not contribute to the public good if his income
is lower than one-third of b’s income. If his income is higher than two-thirds of b’s income, a is the
only contributor. Otherwise, both agents pay for the public good.
It is immediate from equations (4) and (5) that deposits have two types of eﬀects on the players
best response functions. For instance, a one unit increase of da decreases A by (1   k). A enters
directly the best response function and the curves shifts downwards by (1 k)=2. But because deposits
determine the income that is available in step 2, they also constrain the best response function: the3 The model 9
maximum that can be spent on ga decreases (wa   da decreases) and it becomes more likely that
gb > A and hence that ga = 0.
Both, direct and indirect eﬀects go in the same direction: in step 1 the agents may make deposits
in order to decrease their own contribution to the public good and push their partner to increase his
own contribution.
3.2 Step 1: the equilibrium deposits
To structure the discussion I use the two following Lemmas. Both Lemmas are proven in the Appendix.
First, an agent makes positive deposits only if they drive his contribution to the public good down
to zero or if they make his contribution just equal to the money that he brings home.
Lemma 1. 8 i = fa;bg: agent i makes positive deposits only if his deposits are such that gi = 0 or
gi = wi   di.
Lemma 1 clariﬁes that making deposits to increase one’s private consumption is a useful strategy
only if it eﬀectively constrains one’s contribution to the public good in Step 2. If in Step 2, agent i is
willing to contribute less than his available income permits, wi  di, then his deposits do not inﬂuence
his contribution and their only eﬀect is to reduce his private consumption (since depositing money
with the collector is costly). In other words, deposits make sense only if in Step 2, they are such that
the agent would prefer to choose a contribution higher than his available income. In this case, the
other agent, j, knows that i’s contribution will be low and by anticipation j does not make deposits
in order to be able to compensate i’s low contribution in Step 2. This strategic reaction of the other
agent is formally established in Lemma 2, when the ﬁrst agent does not contribute in Step 2.
Lemma 2 states that if one of the agents equilibrium contribution in Step 2 is zero, then the other
agent does not make any deposit in Step 1.
Lemma 2. 8 i = fa;bg: gi = 0 implies dj = 0 and gj = xj = w
j
2 .
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that in step 1, only the following 8 strategies could be Nash equilib-
rium strategies. These 8 strategies are called the “candidates”:
1. da = 0 and db = 0.
2. da = wa and db = 0.
3. da 2 ]0;wa[ , da is such that ga = 0 and db = 0.
4. da 2 ]0;wa[ , da is such that ga = wa   da and db = 0.
5. da 2 ]0;wa[, db 2

0;wb
, da is such that ga = wa   da and db is such that gb = wb   db .








, db is such that gb = wb   db and da = 0.3 The model 10
To determine the Nash equilibrium strategies, I ﬁrst derive the conditions under which each candidate
exists, and thereafter compute the agents utilities corresponding to each candidate. I then compare
the candidates in order to determine which ones are Nash equilibria, and under which conditions. This
discussion is carried out in the Appendix.
The results of the discussion are summarized in Table 1. A gray zone indicates that a strategy is
not feasible given the values of a’s income share (ISa = w
a
wa+wb). The table should be read as follows:




1 k and db = 0

















































Tab. 1: Existence of the Candidates
The discussion carried out in the Appendix reveals some speciﬁc existence conditions given by
Equations 14, 17, 22 and 25.
If ISa  1
3, a’s income is so low compared with b’s income that a’s contribution is zero even if
da = 0. If ISa  1
2k+1, then a’s income is so high compared with b’s income that a would need to
deposit his whole income in order to have a zero contribution in Step 2.
Finally, if ISa < 1
2, a cannot choose da such that ga = wa   da, because he would have to deposit
more than his income. When ISa  3
4, if a sets da such that ga = wa   da, then b optimally chooses
a zero contribution. By Lemma 2, if b’s contribution is zero, a’s deposits must equal zero. Therefore,
when ISa  3
4, in equilibrium da cannot be such that ga = wa   da.3 The model 11
The discussion of Equations 22 and 25 is identical by symmetry.
In order to determine which of the seven remaining candidates are actual Nash equilibria of the
game, I compare the agents utilities in each cases. By doing so, I can check for each candidate under
which conditions one of the agents will have an incentive to deviate and choose another strategy. This
exercise is carried out in the Appendix. Proposition 1 below summarizes the results of the discussion.
Proposition 1. There exists k such that the only Nash equilibrium of the game is da = 0 and db = 0
when k  k (in the speciﬁc case of the log utility functions, k = 8=9). When k > k, the Nash equilibria
are:
























, there are two Nash equilibria: da = 0 and db = w
a+w
b
2 , and da = wa

























: da = w
a+w
b
2 and db = 0
When k > k, the equilibrium strategies are represented in Table 2 for diﬀerent values of a’s
income share, ISa. The table should be read as follows: when ISa 2 [0; 1=3], the Nash equilibrium is








, the two Nash equilibria are (i) da = 0 and db = w
2
and (ii) da = wa and db = 0, etc.
k > k
















da = 0 da = 0 da = 0 da = 0 da = w
2 da = 0
db = 0 db = w
2 db = w
2 db = wb db = 0 db = 0
da = wa da = w
2
db = 0 db = 0
Tab. 2: Equilibrium deposits (w = wa + wb)
The basic intuition underlying Proposition 1 is that when a’s income share, ISa, is low, then a
does not need to make deposits, his equilibrium contribution is anyway equal to zero. Simultaneously,
if ISa is suﬃciently low, b’s income share is so high that b needs to deposit his whole income if he4 The Data 12
wants to constraint and reduce his equilibrium contribution. But because the total cost of the deposits
increases with the deposits, when b’s income is so high b ﬁnds it too costly to deposit his income.
Therefore, the agents do not make deposits when ISa is suﬃciently low. The situation is perfectly
symmetric when ISa is high: again there are no deposits. Hence, an agent may make deposits only
when his income share takes on intermediary values.
A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that in equilibrium at most one agent makes deposits. As
shown in the discussion, when an agent makes deposits, his contribution becomes so low that the other
agent chooses not to make deposits in order to compensate his partner’s low contribution to the public
good.
We can now turn to the welfare consequences of the model.
3.3 Welfare
The welfare implications of the game follow directly from its resolution. They are summarized in
Proposition 2 (the proof is in the appendix), where the welfare is simply deﬁned as the sum of the
agents utilities.
Proposition 2. 8i = fa;bg and j 6= i, compared with the situation where deposits are not possible,
allowing for the existence of deposits has the following impact: (i) when an agent makes deposits,
his utility increases and the other agent’s utility decreases ; the total welfare (ii) increases when the




dj = 0, (iv) remains unaﬀected when the equilibrium is di = 0 and dj = 0.
Proposition 2 informs us that the existence of the daily collection service has an ambiguous impact
on total welfare. To know whether it would be beneﬁcial for the agents that the State, or other
economic actor such as non-governmental organizations, provide an equivalent service at a lower cost,
the impact of an increase of k on total welfare must be determined.
It follows from the analysis made so far that an increase in k could have a positive or negative
eﬀect on the agent’s utilities. If the agents did not make any deposit before k increases, and one of
them makes deposits after, Proposition 2 tells us that the user’s utility increases, the non user’s utility
decreases and the total welfare could increase or decrease. If one of the agents already made deposits
before k increases, his utility increases. The eﬀects on the other agent’s utility and on total welfare
are ambiguous.
If people make deposits only because it is safer, or to commit themselves to save, reducing the cost
of the service can only increase the people’s welfare. On the other hand, if the intra-household motive
plays a part, the loss incurred by the non-users may not be compensated by the gain of the users. The
policy recommendations may then be reversed. I return to the policy implications of the paper in the
conclusion.
4 The Data
The data were collected in 2004 and 2006, in three districts (Vossa, Enagnon, Enagnon-plage) of
Cotonou’s outskirts. Households were randomly selected and all members were interviewed. Men and4 The Data 13
women were always interviewed separately by an enumerator of the same gender: 1179 people older
than 16 were interviewed in 2004 and 873 in 2006 (717 in both years). Information about their jobs,
earnings, belongings, expenses, ﬁnancial transfers, education, religion, etc. was gathered, as well as
detailed data about the ROSCAs, informal insurance groups and the use of the daily collectors.
The variables that are used in the analysis are standard and do not require any speciﬁc explanation.
Only the “self-commitment” variable is not trivial. This is a dummy variable that is equal to one when
an individual is identiﬁed as having a preference for commitment. To measure this variable, we have
raised hypothetical time discount questions (see Sub-section 5.2 for methodological explanations).
Basic descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. We see that 31% of sample individuals are
clients of a daily collector (36% if the sample is restricted to the individuals who actually earn an
income). Most of these clients are women, working in a market. This is not very surprising since
collectors are mainly active in markets and most people working in the markets are women. There
is also a larger proportion of people living in a couple, both monogamist and polygamist, among the
clients. Clients are on average richer than non-clients, and they come from poorer households.
These ﬁrst statistics also come into line with Proposition 1: 57% of the clients have an income that
represents between 25% and 75% of their total household income, while only 33% of the non-clients
do. As predicted by Proposition 1, the non-clients rather have a low income share.7 The fact that
some clients have high income shares does not contradict the theory: one should control for diﬀerent
variables. For instance, richer people have higher income shares and are more likely to make deposits.
Therefore the econometric analysis is required to properly test the main prediction of the model.
Finally, there are more men identiﬁed as time-inconsistent among clients than non-clients. This is
however not true for women.
7 Note that most of the individuals whose income share equals 100% are living alone and should not be aﬀected by
the intra-household motive.4 The Data 14
All sample D.C. clients Non-clients
Number of observations 2052 644 1408
Women 52% 72% 42% ***
Man’s monthly income (if >0) (CFAF) 63 000 64 303 59 620
Woman’s monthly income (if >0) (CFAF) 43 000 47 657 32 983 ***
Household monthly income (CFAF) 121 000 112 000 127 000 **
Income share < 25% 39% 15% 49% ***
Income share 2 [25%;50%[ 22% 32% 18% ***
Income share 2 [50%;75%[ 18% 25% 15% ***
Income share 2 [75%;100%[ 6% 8% 5% ***
Income share = 100% 15% 20% 13% ***
Time inconsistent women 15% 15% 15%
Time inconsistent men 20% 27% 19% *
Literacy rate 51% 34% 59% ***
Age 34 37 33 ***
Household size 5. 2 4.8 5.3 ***
Living in a monogamous couple 38% 47% 34% ***
Living in a polygamous couple 11% 15% 9% ***
Household size 5.2 4.8 5.3 ***
Works in a market 37% 66% 23% ***
Works as taxi-motorbike 2.2% 3.3% 1.7% **
Has a bank account 10.4% 8% 11.6% ***
Participates in a ROSCA 16.6% 21% 15% ***
*, ** and *** indicates that the diﬀerence in means between clients and non-clients is signiﬁcant at
10%, 5% and 1%.
Tab. 3: Descriptive statistics
Table 4 presents additional information about the importance of the deposits. The sample is
restricted to the people who make deposits. Deposits are relatively high, since on average the clients
deposit 36% of their income with a daily collector. Moreover, half of the clients deposit more than
one-fourth of their income.5 Empirical results 15
mean s.d. 25% median 75% 95% mean deposit/income
15 317 21 258 6 000 9 000 15 000 45 000 36%
Tab. 4: Information on deposits (CFAF)
Deposits compose a rather large share of people’s incomes, but they are small amounts in absolute
values: the median of CFAF 9 000 corresponds to € 13.72.
It can be added that 21% of the people who did not use the services of a daily collector in 2004
were making deposits in 2006, while 45% of the people who did use a daily collector in 2004 were
not resorting to it anymore in 2006. This variation is large and will be exploited in the econometric
analysis.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Deposits and relative income
The model predicts a speciﬁc, non-monotonic, relationship between the ratio of an individual’s income
to the total household’s income, and his deposits. Deposits are expected to increase with the income
share when this share is low and to decrease when it is high. There are however other factors that are
expected to inﬂuence people’s deposits.
Deposits shall depend on the individual’s level of income and his household income independently
from his income share. Given that the variable of interest is the individual income divided by his
household income, I cannot control for both the household and the individual’s income in addition to
the income share. In the following tables, I control for the total household income. The regressions
with the individual’s income instead of the household’s income give similar results.
The daily collectors have oﬃces, where people can go to make deposits, and they also operate in
the markets where they go from client to client in order to collect the deposits. People working in
the markets have thus a better access to the service. The taxi-moto drivers, who ride around the city
all day long also have a better access because they can easily stop by a daily collector’s oﬃce. Hence
the inclusion of two dummy variables indicating whether the individual works on the market or is a
taxi-moto driver.
I include binary variables that indicate whether the individual owns a bank account or is a member
of a ROSCA, since those individuals have a possible alternative to the daily collector.
I also control for the size and the composition of the household. All regressions include controls
for the time of the survey (2004 or 2006) and for the neighborhood of the individual (Vossa, Enagnon
and Enagnon plage).
There exist diﬀerent ways of testing the non-monotonic relationship between deposits and income
share. Here are displayed estimations that include the income share and the income share squared. I
obtain similar results with regressions that allow the eﬀect of income shares to change with their level
or with semi-parametric regressions (see appendix B for the results of Robinson (1988) semi-parametric
estimation).5 Empirical results 16
Given that the dependent variable, the deposits, is censored at zero and that nearly 70% of the
observations are zeroes, I use a Tobit estimator.8 As is often the case with expenditures data, the
residuals are not normally distributed when the level of the expenditures is used. Because the non-
normality of the residuals causes a bias of the Tobit estimates, I follow Cameron and Trivedi (2009) by
using the logarithm of the positive expenditures and then setting the truncation point to zero. Given
the panel dimension of the data, standard errors are clustered at the individual’s level. I ﬁrst apply
the Tobit model to the pooled data. The results are displayed in Table 5. In the ﬁrst three columns,
the whole sample is used. Columns 4 to 6 give the results for the sub-sample of women and columns
7 to 9 for the sub-sample of men.
As expected from the theory, the relationship between the deposits and income share is ﬁrst in-
creasing and then decreasing. In the “All sample” and “Women” regressions, the impact of the income
share becomes negative when the income share exceeds around 68%. For men, this reversal happens
after 73%. The impact of the income share is quantitatively very high. According to the regression
“All sample (3)”, everything else being equal, when the income share increases from 20% to 30%, the
deposits increase by 75%. The impact goes down to 6.5% when the income share increases from 60%
to 70%. Deposits decrease by 28% when the income share goes from 80% to 90%.
All other eﬀects are as expected, women, people working in the markets or as taxi-moto and people
coming from bigger families make more deposits, while bank account holders make less deposits.
The estimations presented in Table 5 are vulnerable to the following endogeneity problem: since
individuals who are versed in ﬁnancial matters would better manage their income, their savings and
their business, such unobserved ability would simultaneously aﬀect the income of the individuals and
the use of a daily collector. In this case, the positive eﬀect of the income share would be over-estimated
and its negative eﬀect under-estimated. There is no reason, however, to believe that this ability would
have changed between the two observed periods and therefore controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects
eliminates the problem.
Another possibility is that clients use their deposits to invest in their business. In this case, using
the service would have a positive impact on income. This is not plausible though: the savings recovered
are small (23€ on average, and below 44€ in 95% of the cases) and insuﬃcient to purchase the capital
goods that would increase labor productivity. For example, there are many ﬁshermen in the sample. To
increase their productivity signiﬁcantly, ﬁshermen need to rent bigger and quicker boats or larger nets,
things that are considerably more expensive than what they can save from a month income. Moreover,
I know from the surveys that only 5% of the clients deposit the money recovered each month on their
bank account or in a ROSCA. The remaining 95% spend it immediately on consumption goods. Also,
during the last six months before they were interviewed, the collector’s clients have made professional
investments worth CFAF 918 on average, while the non-clients have spent CFAF 1292 on average. The
diﬀerence is not statistically diﬀerent from zero (Wald test), which indicates that the clients do not
invest more in their business then the non-clients.
8 The increasing-decreasing relationship between the income share and the deposits is very robust to the model













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)5 Empirical results 18
The ﬁxed eﬀects regressions should also clear the other motives for making deposits -self-commitment
and safety- under the assumption that the individual’s aversion to risk and his preference for commit-
ment did not change between the two periods of observation.
Because it is not possible to consistently estimate a standard Tobit model with individual ﬁxed
eﬀects, I use the Trimmed LAD (Tlad) estimates as described by Honoré (1992).
In Table 6, the ﬁxed eﬀects estimations conﬁrm the results. Compared with the previous Tobit
model, the diﬀerences between men and women virtually disappear. The reversal points for the whole
sample, for women and for men are now all close to 68%. As can be seen in Figure 2, the marginal
eﬀects change and the eﬀect of income share is lower in absolute value. According to the ﬁxed eﬀects
regression “All sample (3)”, deposits increase by 37% when the income share increases from 20% to
30%. They increase by 2% when the income share increases from 60% to 70%, and they decrease by
16% when the income share goes from 80% to 90%.
The eﬀects of all other variables have vanished and some coeﬃcients change a lot: the eﬀect of
the household size becomes stronger, the coeﬃcient of working in a market decreases, having a bank
account also has lower eﬀects but the eﬀect of belonging to a ROSCA increases. Even though these
changes can be attributed to some individuals unobserved characteristics, part of the low statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients can be explained by the dramatic loss in the degrees of freedoms and
the lack of within-individual variations when controlling for individuals ﬁxed eﬀects (see the increase
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)5 Empirical results 20
Fig. 2: Predicted values of the log(deposits)
5.2 Estimation of the commitment motive
For the second period of observation (2006), a proxy can be used to assess the importance of the self-
commitment motive. The proxy is a dummy equal to one if the individual is identiﬁed as potentially
making time-inconsistent choices.
The individuals were asked the following hypothetical questions:
A “Would you prefer to receive CFAF 1000 guaranteed in one week or CFAF 1500 guaranteed in
one week and one month ?”
and later:
B “Do you prefer to receive CFAF 2000 guaranteed in one year or CFAF 3000 guaranteed in one
year and one month ?”
People who are impatient today but prefer to be patient in the future are expected to make time
inconsistent choices: because in the future they will be in the same situation as today, they will choose
not to wait. If they are sophisticated (i.e. aware of their time inconsistent choices), they could look
for a self-commitment device. The results of these questions are given in Table 7:5 Empirical results 21
Later (B)
Now (A) Patient Impatient Total
Patient 414 (74%) 144 (26%) 558
Impatient 46 (17%) 221 (83%) 267
Total 460 365 825
Tab. 7: Time-inconsistent choices
The result is that 17% of the individuals are identiﬁed as susceptible of looking for a commitment
device. This identiﬁcation of time-inconsistent individuals is very imperfect. For instance, it depends
on the amounts and the time frame used in the questions.
Despite its shortcomings, I believe that it is worth checking whether the proxy indeed aﬀects the
deposits and to assess the magnitude of its impact. The estimations of the cross-section estimation
(2006) including a binary variable for time-inconsistent choices are given in Table 8. The variable
is called “Self-C”, and “Self-C*woman” is the interaction of being a woman and being identiﬁed as
time-inconsistent. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual makes a deposit.
The econometric speciﬁcation is the same as in Table 5.
In contrast with the ﬁndings of Ashraf et al. (2006b), the eﬀect is positive for men, but negative
for women. I do not have enough information on the people’s preferences to further investigate the
negative eﬀect on women. The positive eﬀect on men is quantitatively high: deposits increase by
202%9 among the men identiﬁed as time-inconsistent. The eﬀect of the income share remains similar
to what was estimated in Tables 5 and 6.
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5.3 Additional evidence: consumption patterns
The intra-household motive asserts that people make deposits to lower their contributions to the
household’s current expenses and increase their private consumption. Therefore, we should observe
diﬀerent patterns of consumption between clients and non clients. However, if the other motives are
at play, making deposits may also allow people to resist temptations and increase their expenditures
on various public goods as well as private goods.
I do not have precise information on what people do with the money that they recover from the
collectors. I can however compare the purchases made by those who make deposits and those who
do not. I use the purchase of one private good, clothes, and three public goods: the electricity bills,
house repairs and school charges. I chose these items because they are the most common expenditures
on goods that are not immediate, current, consumption. On average, they amount to 64% of those
expenditures. Table 9 shows the mean expenses made by men and women, daily collector clients and
non-clients. As expected from the intra-household motive, clients spend less then non-clients on all
three public goods and more on the private good.10
Additionally, I look at the expenditures on frivolous goods. Frivolous expenditures are the sum
of the expenditures made on tobacco, alcohol, candies and other fancy food during the week that
preceded the survey. According to the intra-household motive, daily collector clients shall use their
deposits to increase their consumption of frivolous goods, but on the other hand, according to the
self-commitment motive and temptation theories, the clients may make deposits in order to decrease
their consumption of frivolous goods. The descriptive statistics show that the last eﬀect seems to
dominate on average for women. However, without proper controls, descriptive statistics could be
very misleading. For instance, richer people are expected to purchase more frivolous goods and be less
likely to make deposits (they have a higher income share). This could also explain that women seem
to spend more on electricity when they make deposits.
Therefore, I use Tobit and Tlad estimations to compute the eﬀect of the deposits on these var-
ious expenditures. The results are displayed in Table 13. I again use the logarithm of the positive
expenditures and then set the truncation point to zero. “DC user” is a dummy variable equal to one
if the individual makes deposits. I control for the income of the individual and of his household, his
age and gender, whether he is the household head and whether he owns his house, the composition of
the family, whether he works in a market and I add time and neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects. It emerges
from the regressions that among the public goods, making deposits only aﬀects men’s expenditures on
electricity (it decreases by 93%) but not women’s. Both men and women who make deposits spend
less on school charges. Men who make deposits spend more on house repairs than other men. In
the Fon habits, it is a man’s role to provide a roof for his family (Falen, 2011) and it seems that
this item matters suﬃciently to prompt men to use their deposits to repair the family house. Private
expenditures are strongly correlated with deposits. expenditures on clothes increase sharply for daily
collectors clients, both men and women.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)5 Empirical results 25
What is more unexpected is the eﬀect of making deposits on the purchase of frivolous goods: it
is nil for men but positive and strong for women. On average, a woman’s expenditures on frivolous
goods increase by 196% (Tobit) to 305% (Tlad) if she makes deposits.
5.4 Daily deposits and redistributive pressure
As discussed by Platteau (ming), redistributive norms are pervasive and persistent in African countries,
compared with countries of other continents. The few economists who have discussed redistributive
norms in the context of developing countries tend to stress their negative eﬀects on economic devel-
opment. This follows from the disincentives that they cause. Platteau (ming) distinguishes between
three type of disincentives. First, redistributive pressures discourage eﬀort, since the gains resulting
from any additional productive eﬀort cannot be fully enjoyed but have to be shared. Second, they
discourage entrepreneurship and risk-taking because if a project fails, the risk-taker may have to bear
the burden alone, while if it is successful he will have to share the proﬁts. Finally, redistributive pres-
sures encourage misallocation of human resources: a successful individual will be compelled to hire
his relatives and friends whenever possible. Additionally, it has been argued that belief in magic also
hinder development since it encourages people to blame a reason external to themselves for their very
own failures (Brain, 1982).
Clearly, making deposits could be a way to protect income against ﬁnancial claims, both because
the deposits cannot be readily redrawn and because they might be concealed and unknown to one’s
relatives. Therefore, those using the service should eﬀectively transfer less money if they consider the
claims as illegitimate. On the other hand, using the daily collector enables the accumulation of a lump
sum that can be used for legitimate transfers.
Consequently, it is expected that daily collector’s clients increase some transfers and reduce others.
In Table 11, the amount of transfers given are presented for four categories of recipients: kids, spouse,
acquaintances and parish fellows. 11
From the all sample columns, it seems that using the daily collector permits to decrease all transfers.
However the decomposition by gender oﬀers a more subtle pattern. Transfers by men-users all decrease,
but women’s use of a daily collector seems to enable them to reduce their transfers to their husband
and to increase their transfers to their kids and friends.
11 Only the irregular transfers appear in the table. For example if a father gives his son CFAF 150 every morning for
his lunch, this transfer is not in the table. But if the son asks his father some help to buy a bicycle, it is included. The
reason is that regular transfers are the results of longer terms arrangements (as documented by Falen, 2011). A husband
for example will give CFAF 2 000 to his wife on the market days and CFAF 150 to his son each morning for his lunch
and that long-lasting arrangement shall not be interrupted or modiﬁed in the month in which the husband decides to
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Mean value of the gifts in CFAF and (% of Income)



































































Tab. 11: Summary of Gifts
The Tobit and Tlad estimations given in Table 12. The regressions partly conﬁrm the descriptive
statistics. Everything else equal, men who make deposits make less gifts to their children and parish





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I wrote a model of strategic interactions between two members of a single household. In equilibrium,
the model’s agents use the daily collection service in order to bring less money home and constrain
their own contribution to the household’s public current expenses. By doing so they can divert some
resources from the household’s public consumption to their own private consumption and drive their
partner to increase his contribution to the public good. I called this strategy the intra-household motive
for making deposits.
According to the model, only the people with an income close to their partner’s income make
deposits. If two people have very diﬀerent incomes, in equilibrium the one with the lowest income
contributes very little, or even not at all, to the public good and therefore do not make costly deposits
to decrease a contribution that is already very low. Simultaneously, the one with the highest income
would need to make very high deposits if he wants to prompt the low income earner to increase his
contribution. Because the cost is proportional to the deposits, he will prefer not to make any deposits
either.
In the empirical part, I provide strong evidence in support of the intra-household motive. I used
the panel structure of the data and ﬁxed eﬀects at the individual level to clear the estimations from
the time constant motives of safety and commitment.
Moreover, using a proxy that identiﬁes time-inconsistent individuals, I showed that the commitment
motive is an important determinant of men’s deposits, but not of women’s.
I ﬁnally showed that users and non-users of the daily collection service exhibit diﬀerent patterns
of consumption: men users contribute less to the purchase of electricity, both men and women users
spend less on school expenditures for their children and spend more on new personal clothes. Women
consumption of frivolous goods also increase by 200% to 300% when they make deposits.
I also ﬁnd that men who make deposits make fewer gifts to their children and parish fellows, while
women give less money to their spouse if they make deposits.
These ﬁndings are important for the understanding of a widespread informal saving device. In
particular, the intra-household motive has strong policy implications. As the model showed, improving
the access to the daily collectors may hurt rather than favor the population as a whole. Now that
big donors are pushing small ﬁnancial institutions to encourage savings,12 the negative eﬀects that I
underlined may need to be evaluated.
The evidence also emphasizes the importance of savings among the poorest members of society and
lead me to disagree with the researchers who pretend that the poor cannot and do not save.
I believe that the popularity of the daily collection service and the relevance of the three motives
-safety, commitment and intra-household- arise from the possibility to deposit savings in the same day
as the income is received. This is a service that more formal institutions such as banks or MFIs do not
currently oﬀer. However, if one wants to increase the level of formal savings in developing countries
then using new technologies such as ’mobile money’, where deposits on a bank account could be made
at a very low cost and at any time using a mobile phone, sounds very promising.13
12 The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation for instance announced grants worth $38m to MFIs in South Asia, Latin
America and Africa to encourage them to expand their savings oﬀerings (The Economist, 2010).
13 For examples of ’mobile money’ see The Economist (2009) and The Economist (2011).6 Conclusion 30
Before recommending policies that result from the model, such as the targeting of low-cost deposit
collection in favor of women or individuals living alone, further investigations are however needed.6 Conclusion 31
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Proofs and discussion of the model
1. Proof of Lemma 1:
The Lemma is proven for A. If A’s deposits are such that ga =
A g
b
2 , there are three possibilities:
(a) If gb = 0: g = A
2 and xa = A
2 . Both, g and x are decreasing in da. Therefore A’s utility is
decreasing in da and A optimally chooses da = 0.








2 . Again, A’s utility is decreasing in
da and A optimally chooses da = 0.
(c) If gb =
B g
a
2 : g = 1
3 (A + B) and xa = 1
3 (A + B). A’s utility is decreasing in da and A
optimally chooses da = 0.
2. Proof of Lemma 2:
The Lemma is proven when ga = 0. If ga = 0, then either (i) gb = wb   db and xb = kdb or (ii)
gb = B
2 and xb = B
2 .






. In Step 1, B chooses db = w
b
2 and B’s utility













(b) In case (ii): gb and xb are both decreasing in db. Therefore B chooses db = 0 in Step 1 and













Clearly, B prefers case (ii) to case (i). Because B can always choose to make zero deposits, he
chooses db = 0 in Step 1 if ga = 0, in order to obtain the level of utility of case (ii) rather then
the one of case (i).
3. Existence of the candidates and corresponding payoﬀs:
(a) If da = 0 and db = 0, three cases follow from Equations 2 and 3 :
i. If ISa < 1
3, then ga = 0, gb = xb = w
b




















ii. If ISa > 2
3, then gb = 0, ga = xa = w
a




























, then ga = 2
3wa  1
3wb, gb = 2
3wb  1



















































(c) If da 2 ]0;wa[ , da is such that ga = 0 and db = 0. In this case, xa = wa   (1   k)da. From




1 k . This inequality
is called condition C2. By Lemma 2 db = 0, gb = xb = w
b





1 k . Since g is independent of da and xa is decreasing in da, A optimally












































Where ISa is A’s income share in the total income: ISa = w
a
wa+wb.
(d) If da 2 ]0;wa[ , da is such that ga = wa  da and db = 0. From Equations 2 and 3, we know




1+k . This inequality is called condition C4.
Two cases have to be discussed:
i. If wa   da  wb then gb = 0 and by Lemma 2 da = 0, which contradicts that in
candidate 4: da 2 ]0;wa[.












2 and xa = kda. Under
these equalities, i’s utility is maximized when da = w
a+w
b




2 , gb = 3
4wb   1





























Note that this candidate only exists if wa   w
a+w
b
2 > wb, w
a+w
b





















(e) If da 2 ]0;wa[, db 2

0;wb
, da is such that ga = wa   da and db is such that gb = wb   db.









1+k . Given that ga = wa   da and gb = wb   db,








1+k . The two conditions together
imply that da  w
a+w
b
2+k and db  w
b+w
a
2+k , which are possible only if (i) w
a+w
b




2+k < wb. Nonetheless, (i) holds when wa > w
b
k and (ii) holds when wa < kwb: since
k < 1, one of the two conditions (i) and (ii) is necessarily violated. Hence, candidate 5
cannot exist.

























(g) If db 2

0;wb








































(h) If db 2

0;wb








































4. Identiﬁcation of the Nash equilibria (Proof of Proposition 1):





, the agents can only choose to make zero deposits or to deposit their
whole income. The comparison of Equation 4 with Equation 10 and Equation 5 with
19 shows that Ua  
da = 0 j db = 0

 Ua  
da = wa j db = 0

14 and Ub  




db = wb j da = 0

. Therefore, the only Nash equilibrium is da = 0 and db = 0.





, B does not need to deposit his whole income in order to drive his contri-
bution down to zero. He could choose db = w
a+w
b
2 . The comparison of Equations 5 and 24





2 j da = 0

 Ub  
db = 0 j da = 0









3 and ISa < 1
3. Moreover, Ub  




db = wb j da = 0

(Equations 5 and 19) and Ua  
da = 0 j db = 0

 Ua  
da = wa j db = 0

(Equations 4 and 10). The only Nash Equilibrium is da = 0 and db = 0.






, by comparing Equations 8 and 12 I obtain that Ua  









1 k j db = 0

. Equations 9 and 24 reveal that Ub  








2 j da = 0

only if k  8






2 j da = 0

 Ub  
db = wb j da = 0

. The comparison of Equa-
tions 8 and 10, and Equations 9 and 19, uncovers that Ua  




da = wa j db = 0

and Ub  
db = 0 j da = 0

 Ub  
db = wb j da = 0

if k > 8


















2k+1. Therefore, the Nash
equilibrium is da = 0 and db = 0 if k  8
9 and da = 0 and db = w
a+w
b
2 if k > 8
9.






. We already know that Ua  
da = 0 j db = 0

 Ua  
da = wa j db = 0

and Ub  
db = 0 j da = 0

 Ub  
db = wb j da = 0

if k > 8





2 . We also
know that Ub  







2 j da = 0








2 j da = 0

 Ub  
db = wb j da = 0

. Therefore, if k > 8






there are two Nash equilibria (i) da = wa and db = 0 (ii) da = 0 and db = w
a+w
b







2 , the only Nash equilibrium is da = 0 and db = w
a+w
b
2 . If k  8
9, the
only Nash equilibrium is da = 0 and db = 0.






. By symmetry, if k > 8





2 , there are two Nash
equilibria (i) da = w
a+w
b
2 and db = 0 (ii) da = 0 and db = wb. If k > 8






the only Nash equilibrium is da = w
a+w
b
2 and db = 0. If k  8
9, the only Nash equilibrium
is da = 0 and db = 0.
14 This inequality should be read: conditional on B playing db = 0, A’s utility is higher if A plays da = 0 than if A
plays da = wa.6 Conclusion 38






. By symmetry, the Nash equilibrium is da = 0 and db = 0 if k  8
9
and da = w
a+w
b
2 and db = 0 if k > 8
9.





. By symmetry, the only Nash equilibrium is da = 0 and db = 0.




, again the only Nash equilibrium is da = 0 and db = 0.
5. Proof of Proposition 2:
If ISa  1
3 or ISa  2
3, in equilibrium the agents do not make deposits and therefore their utilities
are not aﬀected by the possibility to make deposits. Therefore I only compare the utilities for





. In this case, if the agents are not allowed to make deposits, from
































First, when da = wa, A’s utility is given by Ua
2 (Equation 10) and B’s utility is given by Ub
2
(Equation 11) : Ua
2 > Ua







NOd when ISa > 1
3. Moreover,
the gain in A’s utility, Ua
2   Ua























2 ISa (1   ISa) > 9









2 , ISa > 1
3 and ISa > 1
2k+1 are guaranteed since otherwise
da = wa could not be an equilibrium strategy.
Second, when da = w
a+w
b
2 , A’s utility is given by Ua
4 (Equation 15) and B’s utility is given by
Ub
4 (Equation 16) : it is immediate that Ua
4 > Ua







The case of db > 0 is symmetrical and therefore part (i), (ii) and (iii) of the proposition have
been proven. Part (iv) is straightforward.6 Conclusion 39
Robinson (1988) Semi-Parametric Estimator
The results of semi-parametric estimations, following Robinson (1988), conﬁrm that deposits are in-
creasing in the income share when the income share is low, and decreasing when it is high. The turning
point computed also corresponds to the results of the Ols, Tobit and panel Fixed Eﬀects displayed
above. The econometric model controls for the linear relationship between the deposits and all the
controls used in the paper (corresponding to column 3 of Tables 5, 6 and 7), but the relationship
between deposits and income share is not constrained to be linear. The routine developed by Verardi
and Debarsy (2011) is used to compute the coeﬃcients. The results are presented in Figure 3. The
predicted values of the logarithm of the deposits are on the vertical axis and the income share on the
horizontal axis.
Fig. 3: Semi-parametric estimation: predicted relationship between log(deposits) and income share